Religious Freedom Issues in Domestic Relations Law by Tyner, Mitchell A.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 9
3-1-1994
Religious Freedom Issues in Domestic Relations
Law
Mitchell A. Tyner
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mitchell A. Tyner, Religious Freedom Issues in Domestic Relations Law, 8 BYU J. Pub. L. 457 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol8/iss2/9
Religious Freedom Issues in 
Domestic Relations Law 
Mitchell A. Tyner* 
Domestic relations cases involving either judicial 
preference among religious views and/or the right of parents to 
inculcate religious values and beliefs in their children occur in 
a narrow range of fact patterns and receive limited public 
notice. But the inconsistency of both analysis and result should 
give pause to those who take their religious liberty seriously. 
Three areas in which religious freedom has troubled courts 
are: (1) religious differences without more as a basis for the 
divorce, (2) regulation of the custodial parents' right to give 
religious instruction, and (3) custody grants based on the 
religious preferences of the parents. 
I. RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES AS A BASIS FOR DIVORCE 
The use of religious belief or practice as a ground for 
divorce is rare, but the potential exists. In an Ohio case, 1 both 
parents had been Catholic at marriage. 2 A year later the wife 
became a Jehovah's Witness.3 She stopped going to_ family 
gatherings, refused to celebrate holidays, and a divorce action 
followed shortly.4 
In affirming the divorce decree, the appellate court 
distinguished between differences in religious faith and the 
detrimental consequences that adherence to a particular faith 
may have: 
Although a difference in the religious faith of a spouse does 
not constitute a ground for divorce, a religious conviction may 
* Copyright 1993 by Mitchell A. Tyner, Esq., Associate General Counsel for 
the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists. B.A. Union College; M.A. 
Andrews University; J.D. Nashville School of Law. 
1 Pater v. Pater, No. C-890553, 1990 WL 162021 (Ohio App. Oct. 24, 1990). 
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induce a spouse to do things that would constitute a ground 
for a divorce. It is permissible for each spouse to have his or 
her own religious beliefs, but if one carries such beliefs to the 
extent of disrupting and destroying the family life, her 
conduct may constitute extreme cruelty.5 
II. CUSTODIAL AND NON-CUSTODIAL RELIGIOUS 
INSTRUCTION RIGHTS 
Far more common are cases in which a religious practice is 
an issue in custody proceedings. A typical problem is 
determining whether the non-custodial parent has a right to 
teach religious values to the child. The standard in virtually 
every jurisdiction is that the custodial parent determines 
religious training. 6 But is that right exclusive or must it be 
shared with the non-custodial parent? 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that right to be 
non-exclusive. 7 The court addressed, (1) whether an order 
prohibiting a father from taking his children to religious 
services "contrary to the Jewish faith" during periods of lawful 
custody violated his free exercise rights, and (2) whether the 
father could be directed to present the children at synagogue 
for religious services during his periods of weekend visitation. 8 
The court ruled that (1) the restriction was unconstitutional,9 
and (2) the requirement was valid. 10 
Pamela and David Zummo were married in 1978, had 
three children and were divorced in 1988.11 Pamela was 
raised a Jew and actively practiced her faith since childhood.12 
David was raised a Roman Catholic but attended only 
sporadically .13 Prior to marriage Pamela and David agreed 
that any children would be raised in the Jewish faith. 14 The 
trial court's order in their divorce action provided that David 
5 Id. at *2 (citations omitted). 
6 See generally Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of 
Religion in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383 
(1989). 
7 Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
8 Id. at 1132. 
9 Id. at 1157. 
10 Id. at 1158. 
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was not permitted to take the children to "religious services 
contrary to the Jewish faith"15 and that he was obligated 
during his weekend visitations to arrange for the children's 
synagogue attendance. 16 David appealed those sections of the 
order, alleging breach of First Amendment protection. 17 
The trial court noted six factors in support of the 
challenged restrictions. 18 First, the Zummo's had orally agreed 
to raise their children as Jews. 19 But, the appellate court 
found: 
[S]everal persuasive grounds [exist] upon which to deny legal 
effect to such agreements: 1) such agreements are generally 
too vague to demonstrate a meeting of minds, or to provide an 
adequate basis for objective enforcement; 2) enforcement of 
such an agreement would promote a particular religion, serve 
little or no secular purpose, and would excessively entangle 
the courts in religious matters; and 3) enforcement would be 
contrary to a public policy embodied in the First Amendment 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (as well as their 
state equivalents) that parents be free to doubt, question, and 
change their beliefs, and that they be free to instruct their 
children in accordance with those beliefs.20 
Therefore, said the court, the trial court erred in giving too 
much deference to the pre-nuptial agreement.21 
The trial court also cited the children's pre-divorce 
religious training and concluded that they had asserted 
personal religious identities that must be respected.22 The 
appellate court doubted any such assertion by three, four and 
eight-year-olds, and stated: 
In order to avoid arrogating to itself unconstitutional 
authority to declare orthodoxy in determining religious 
identity, courts only recognize a legally cognizable religious 
identity when such an identity is asserted by the child itself, 
and then only if the child has reached sufficient maturity and 
intellectual development to understand the significance of 
such an assertion. We conclude that whatever religious 
15 ld. at 1142. 
16 I d. 
17 I d. 
18 I d. 
19 !d. 
20 ld. at 1144. 
21 ld. at 1148. 
22 [d. 
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training the three, four, and eight-year-old children had 
received, they lacked capacity to assert a legally cognizable 
religious identity, and in fact, made no attempt to assert such 
an identity; consequently, no legally cognizable religious 
identity had been acquired. Consideration of the children's 
presumed religious identity, under the circumstances 
presented here, was constitutionally impermissible and an 
abuse of discretion.23 
The trial court also opined that "stability and consistency 
in a child's religious inculcation has been recognized as an 
important factor in determining the best interest of the 
child.'124 Again, the appeals court disagreed: 
[W]e conclude that while the desire to provide or maintain 
stability in the already tumultuous context of a divorce is 
generally a significant factor in custody determinations, 
courts constitutionally cannot have any interest in the 
stability of a child's religious beliefs. The consideration of the 
children's presumed interests in spiritual stability was 
constitutionally impermissible and an abuse of discretion.25 
The trial court's fourth factor was the contrast between the 
mother's active Judaism and the father's sporadic 
Catholicism. 26 The Superior Court said: 
[N]either determination of, nor consideration of, parents' 
relative devoutness or activeness in religious activities has 
any place in custody determinations. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that "no person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, or for 
church attendance or nonattendance," and that, "the 
Establishment Clause at the very least, prohibits government 
from ... making adherence to a religion relevant in any way 
to a person's standing in the political community."27 
Consideration of the parents' relative devoutness does precisely 
what is forbidden. 
Factor five was the trial court's perception that "the 
practice of Judaism and that of Roman Catholicism cannot be 
squared. To accept and adhere to the teachings of one 
23 ld. at 1149. 
24 ld. at 1150 (citation omitted). 
25 ld. at 1152. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. (citations omitted). 
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necessarily requires a rejection of the other."28 True or not, 
said the higher court, this was improper. 
[E]ven irreconcilable doctrinal differences in the religious 
beliefs held by divorced parents would not provide a basis for 
imposing restrictions upon a parent's visitation or joint 
custody rights in absence of a showing of a substantial threat 
of harm to the child arising from those differences in absence 
of the proposed restrictions. 29 
The trial court's sixth factor cited was the perceived 
possibility of harmful effects from exposure to "inconsistent" 
religions.30 The appellate panel responded: 
[E]ach parent must be free to provide religious exposure and 
instruction as that parent sees fit, during any and all periods 
of legal custody or visitation without restriction, unless the 
challenged beliefs or conduct of the parent are demonstrated 
to present a substantial threat of present or future, physical 
or emotional harm to the child in the absence of the proposed 
restriction . . . . [T]his standard requires proof of a 
"substantial threat" rather than "some probability." We also 
emphasize that while the harm involved may be present or 
future harm, the speculative possibility of mere disquietude, 
disorientation, or confusion arising from exposure to 
"contradictory" religions would be a patently insufficient 
"emotional harm" to justify encroachment by the government 
upon constitutional parental and religious rights of parents, 
even in the context of divorce.31 
In sum, the court held: 
[l]n order to justify restrictions upon parent's rights to 
inculcate religious beliefs in their children, the party seeking 
the restriction must demonstrate by competent evidence that 
the belief or practice of the party to be restricted actually 
presents a substantial threat of present or future physical or 
emotional harm to the particular child or children involved in 
absence of the proposed restriction, and that the restriction is 
the least intrusive means adequate to prevent the specified 
harm.32 
28 ld. at 1153 (citation omitted). 
29 ld. at 1154. 
30 ld. 
31 ld. at 1154-55 (citations omitted). 
32 ld. at 1157. 
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In this case, the mother did not meet this standard of proof. 
Finally, on the issue of the requirement that David provide 
for synagogue attendance during his visitation periods, the 
court said: 
The trial court found "little if any" distinction between 
prohibiting the father's affirmative act of taking his children 
to Catholic services and its direction that the father present 
the children at the Synagogue for Sunday School. We, on the 
other hand, find a material and controlling distinction; and 
consequently, affirm that part of the order requiring the 
father to present his children at the Synagogue for Sunday 
School.33 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska gave lip service to the 
non-custodial parent's right to share religious beliefs with his 
children, yet allowed significant restrictions on that right in 
actual practice. 34 In that case, as in the Ohio case, both 
Edward and Diane LeDoux had been Catholic at the time of 
their marriage. 35 Their children, Andrew and Peter, were 
baptized in the Catholic faith. 36 In July, 1985, Edward began 
worshipping as a Jehovah's Witness.37 Diane and Edward 
separated on April 1, 1986.38 At the divorce trial, the principal 
contested issues were visitation rights and specific restrictions 
that Diane wished to impose on Edward with regard to his 
religious activities with the children.39 
The trial court found that numerous differences existed in 
both belief and practice between Catholics and Jehovah's 
Witnesses.4° Concluding that exposing the children to more 
than one religious practice would have a deleterious effect on 
them, the court awarded custody to Diane, established a strict 
visitation schedule, and directed Edward not to "expose or 
permit himself or any other person to expose the minor 
children of the parties to any religious practices or teachings 
that are inconsistent with the religious teachings espoused by 
the [appellee], being the Catholic religion by which the children 
33 ld. (citation omitted). 
34 LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1990). 
35 ld. at 2. 




40 ld. at 4. 
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are being raised."41 It further ordered that while with the 
children, Edward could not prevent them from engaging in 
activities normally permitted by the Catholic religion.42 
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed and held that 
courts have a duty to consider whether religious beliefs 
threaten the health and well-being of a child.43 Thus, "when a 
court finds that particular religious practices pose an 
immediate and substantial threat to a child's temporal well-
being, a court may fashion an order aimed at protecting the 
child from that threat."44 However, in so doing, "a court must 
narrowly tailor its order to result in the least possible intrusion 
upon constitutionally protected parental interests."45 The 
court held that: 
The order of the trial court is narrowly tailored in that it 
imposes the least possible intrusion upon Edward LeDoux's 
right of free exercise of religion and the custodial mother's 
right to control the religious training of a child. The custodial 
parent normally has the right to control the religious training 
of the child. The dissolution decree merely forecloses the 
exposure of the LeDoux children to those practices and 
teachings which are inconsistent with the Catholic religion. 
The appellant is free to discuss beliefs of the Jehovah's 
Witnesses with his children so long as they are consistent 
with the Catholic religion. 46 
Justice Shanahan, in a lengthy dissent, concluded that: 
What the majority has characterized as a "narrowly tailored" 
visitation order is, in reality, a judicial straitjacket, 
constricting Edward LeDoux and preventing him from 
discussing with his children any religious belief or practice 
which may contradict or conflict with Catholic doctrine. Thus, 
the LeDoux visitation order prohibits Edward LeDoux's free 
exercise of his religion in reference to his children and, 
consequently, constitutes a denial of religious freedom 
protected by the state and federal Constitutions. 47 
41 ld. at 4-5. 
42 ld. at 5. 
43 ld. (citations omitted). 
44 ld. 
45 ld. 
46 ld. at 5-6 (citation omitted). 
47 ld. at 12 (Shanahan, J., dissenting). 
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The Supreme Court of Montana dealt with the question of 
how religious education compares with other custodial 
issues.48 The trial court awarded joint custody but concluded 
that the child would live with his mother after age six in order 
to facilitate school attendance. 49 The father argued that such 
an arrangement effectively prevented him from sharing his 
Jewish heritage with his son.50 On appeal, the state high 
court affirmed.51 Although ruling that neither parent shall 
have exclusive right to determine the child's religious education 
and affiliation, the supreme court upheld the trial court's 
residency scheme, observing that "an award of custody for the 
purpose of religious education should not dominate other 
elements which comprise the best interests of this particular 
child."52 
A Canadian court recently went much further, ruling that 
the custodial parent has the sole and exclusive right to 
determine religious training, restraining the father from even 
discussing his religion with his children or taking them to 
religious services and restraining both parties from making 
adverse comments to the children about the other's religion.53 
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin recently agreed, 54 ruling 
that a state statute gives the custodial parent the right to 
choose the religion for the children, and construing it to provide 
that parent with protection from subversion.55 
III. CUSTODY GRANTS BASED ON RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES 
Before courts may decide which parent controls religious 
training, they must decide which parent wins custody of the 
child. Here the decisions are at least as inconsistent and even 
more troubling. 
In an Ohio case,56 both parents had been Catholic at 
marriage.57 A year later the wife became a Jehovah's 
48 In re Marriage of Gersovitz, 779 P.2d 883 (Mont. 1989). 
49 ld. at 884. 
50 ld. at 884-85. 
51 ld. at 885. 
52 ld. 
53 Young v. Young, 24 R.F.L.3d 192 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1989). This case was 
argued before the Supreme Court of Canada on January 25, 1993. 
54 In re Marriage of Lange, 502 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
55 ld. at 146. 
56 Pater v. Pater, No. C-890553, 1990 WL 162021 (Ohio App. Oct. 24, 1990). 
57 ld. at *1. 
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Witness.58 She stopped going to family gatherings, refused to 
celebrate holidays, and a divorce action followed shortly. 59 The 
trial court awarded custody to the father and the mother 
appealed, arguing that the court unconstitutionally based its 
decision on her religious practices. 60 The Ohio Court of 
Appeals affirmed on the child custody issue: 
[l]f [the mother] were granted custody, the child would be less 
likely to receive proper medical attention, obtain a college 
education, or participate in social activities at school or with 
Robert's family. In addition, the child's relationship with his 
father would be more likely to be severely damaged as a 
result of [the mother's] belief that the Catholic Church and 
Christmas are 'bad' and that non-Witnesses are evil.61 
Happily, the decision regarding child custody was 
overturned by the Supreme Court of Ohio.62 Said the state's 
high court, focusing on the welfare of the child: 
A parent may not be denied custody on the basis of his or her 
religious practices unless there is probative evidence that 
those practices will adversely affect the mental or physical 
health of the child. Evidence that the child will not be 
permitted to participate in certain social or patriotic activities 
is not sufficient to prove possible harm.63 
In a Pennsylvania case,64 the trial court found that the 
father, with whom the children had lived after their mother 
left, was an exemplary parent.65 Nevertheless, the trial court 
awarded the mother custody because the court disapproved of 
the father's fundamentalist Christian beliefs and his 
enrollment of the children in a religious school. 66 The trial 
court stated: 
[l]t is the degree to which the father has pursued "life in the 
Lord" that has deprived the children of social and educational 




61 ld. at *2. 
62 Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992). 
63 ld. at 800. 
64 Stolarick v. Novak, 584 A.2d 1034 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
65 ld. at 1035. 
66 ld. 
466 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
approach to life that is very restricted in view and allows for 
no spontaneity, artistic expression or individual development 
of rationale or logic or even just pursuit of ordinary curiosity. 
These children are being raised in a sterile world with very 
rigid precepts, with no allowance for difference of opinion, and 
no greater breadth than the doctrinaire limits of the religious 
beliefs.67 
On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding those 
statements to be only the views of the trial judge, unsupported 
by the record. 68 Said the court: 
The record in the instant case reveals no basis for the trial 
court's belief that the children's horizons would be broadened 
by removing them from the "sterile" environment of a 
religiously oriented school. Both parents adore the children 
and are genuinely interested in playing a role in their future. 
For five years since the separation of their parents, however, 
they have lived with their father in a single residential home, 
and their father has ably devoted himself to their care. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it suddenly took them from the only home and family 
which they have known and awarded them to another whose 
facilities, if not inadequate, were less desirable and less 
familiar than those to which the children had been 
accustomed. 69 
In virtually all American jurisdictions, the paramount 
consideration in child custody proceedings is the best interest 
of the child. 70 While that ideal is no doubt proper, its 
attainment is a highly subjective task. Assumptions about 
which interests are "best" for a child have been shaped by 
history and dominant social custom. While such cultural 
influences are not inherently objectionable, they may allow 
stereotypes to influence a court's decision when one parent has 
adopted the values of an unpopular religious minority. Courts 
may be tempted to adopt some standardized "all-American" 
ideal as their guide to a child's best interest. 
67 Id. at 1036. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1038. 
70 See generally JEFF ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE § 4.02 
(1986); JoHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 10.02 (1987). 
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A couple of commentators have explained the problem in 
practical application of this amorphous "best interest" 
standard: 
Since the trial judge's decision will be reversed only upon 
a clear showing of abuse, a judge might draft his custody 
order to promote one belief over another to hide his 
motivation within the side discretion afforded him by the 
imprecision of the 'best interest' standard.71 
The reality is that the exercise of judicial discretion is far 
less a product of the judge's learning than of his or her 
temperament, background, interests and biases.72 
A disturbing example is seen in the case of Mendez v. 
Mendez.73 Rita and Ignacio Mendez were married in 1981. At 
that time both considered themselves to be Roman Catholics, 
although neither practiced that faith. During the course of 
their marriage, they attended Catholic services on only three 
occasions. 74 
Rebecca Mendez, the couple's child, was born six months 
after her parents' marriage. When she was approximately a 
year old, Ignacio decided that Rebecca should be baptized as a 
Catholic. Rita did not want Rebecca baptized but arranged for 
it to please Ignacio. 75 
In April 1983, Rita became involved in the Jehovah's 
Witnesses faith. She thereafter became a practicing member of 
that religion, which resulted in the onset of marital difficulties. 
Ignacio believed that Jehovah's Witnesses were "totally 
different" and "against society."76 He felt that his wife had 
"betrayed him" by her conversion and ordered her to cease 
attending Jehovah's Witnesses' meetings.77 When she failed to 
71 Steven M. Zarowny, Note, The Religious Upbringing of Children After 
Divorce, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 160, 165 (1980). 
72 Dorinda N. Noble, Custody Contest: How to Divide and Reassemble a 
Child, 64 Soc. CASEWORK 406, 407 (1983). 
73 527 So. 2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
74 The facts concerning the Mendez' marriage, religious practices, divorce 
and subsequent court action are essentially those set out in Rita Mendez' Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Menendez v. Menendez, 527 So.2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1987) (No. 87-1166), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 1030 (1988) 
[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. 
75 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 74, at 4. 
76 !d. 
77 ld. 
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do so, Ignacio petitioned for dissolution of the marriage and for 
custody of Rebecca. 
Religion was the central issue during the two-day custody 
trial. The transcript of the divorce proceeding comprises four 
volumes. Volumes one through three concern the custody issue 
and consist of 485 pages. Volume four deals with financial 
matters and is forty-five pages long. Of the 485 pages 
concerning custody, 249 pages (51%) contain references to 
religion. 78 
At trial, Ignacio testified that he sought custody of Rebecca 
because it was contrary to her best interest to be raised as a 
Jehovah's Witness. He sought to bolster that allegation by the 
testimony of two psychologists and one psychiatrist. However, 
all agreed that Rita was the preferred custodial parent and was 
the parent with whom Rebecca had the deepest attachment. 
The court-appointed guardian ad litem concurred, testifying 
that: "[Rebecca] was either going to cease living with her 
father, which was going to be difficult for her, or she would 
cease living with her mother, which was going to devastate 
her."79 
The expert witnesses also agreed that Ignacio was not a 
desirable custodial parent because he had no plans to care for 
Rebecca. Ignacio testified that if he were awarded custody he 
would either have to hire a live-in maid or else move to his 
mother's home and live there with his sister and her two 
children so that either his mother or his sister could care for 
Rebecca.80 Dr. Eli Levy, one of the psychologists, testified that 
he would not recommend Ignacio as custodial parent for two 
reasons: "One is the emotional state between the mother and 
the child. That needs to be taken care of and guarded. 
Secondly, my understanding of Mr. Ignacio's work is that the 
man has to go to work and it requires travel at times out of the 
city."81 
Each of the experts and the guardian ad litem were 
troubled by the "problem" of Rita's religion. The "problem" 
according to Dr. Levy, was that Jehovah's Witnesses are 
"different."82 According to Dr. Richard Greenbaum, the second 
78 ld. 
79 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 74, at A24. 
80 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 74, at 5-6. 
81 ld. at 6. 
82 ld. at 6-7. 
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psychologist, the religion was problematic in that it "deviates" 
and is "not mainstream."83 
Dr. Greenbaum speculated about the difficulties that four-
year-old Rebecca might face in the future if she were raised as 
a Jehovah's Witness but attended public school: 
[A]s a Jehovah's Witness she would have difficulty in dealing 
with the different values as they apply socially, in terms of 
school and religious holidays, which are not perceived as 
religious, exclusively by the children, such as Christmas and 
in terms of saluting the flag and things of that nature.84 
Despite their reservations about Ignacio, each of the 
experts testified that it would be better for Rebecca to be a 
Catholic, and, therefore, raised by Ignacio and his family, 
because Jehovah's Witnesses are not part of the mainstream of 
society. Dr. Levy testified: 
Living in this society, she needs to adapt herself to the 
mainstream of culture. She is growing up and it is not a 
country of Jehovah's Witnesses. If the majority of the country 
was Jehovah's Witnesses, we would not have any problem, 
except for physically, but, as far as - I am not making the 
statement because she is a Jehovah's Witness per se, but the 
philosophy of practicing the religion does not allow Rebecca to 
benefit and be safeguarded in living in this culture. 
I believe that being raised a Jehovah's Witness would not 
be in the best interest of the child, given the fact that the 
principles, the way I understand them, do not fit in the 
western way of life in this society. 
Q. You think it is unhealthy for a child to be a Jehovah's 
Witness in this culture? 
A. I say it is unhealthy for this child to be raised as a 
Jehovah's Witness. 
Q. Because she would not fit in the mainstream of society? 
A. Yes.85 
Dr. Levy had previously testified as follows: 
Not that I am stating which one is better, but living in 
the western society, the part and parcel of the emotional 
health is the ability of the individual to adapt to a particular 
culture . . . . Bringing her up Catholic would allow her to 
83 !d. at 8-9. 
84 !d. at 19. 
85 !d. at 21-22. 
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adapt to our society and have the freedom that Catholic 
children have in the society, rather than take the chance and 
possibility and create a definite state in raising her as a 
Jehovah's Witness.86 
The custody proceeding ended on October 2, 1985, when 
Judge Philip Knight determined that it was in the ''best 
interest" of Rebecca that Ignacio be her custodial parent. The 
court also decreed that: 
All decisions which relate to the religious training, welfare, 
religious education and teaching are the duty and sole 
responsibility of the husband. The wife shall not expose or 
permit any other person to expose the minor child to any 
religious practices, attendances, teachings or events which are 
in any way inconsistent with the Catholic religion. Nor shall 
the wife preclude the child from engaging in any activity 
which is permitted by the Catholic religion .... 87 
On April 28, 1987, Florida's District Court of Appeal, Third 
District, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.88 Two 
members of the three-judge panel concluded that the record did 
not demonstrate that the trial court granted custody to Ignacio 
solely because of Rita's religion.89 They stated that it is the 
right of a trial court, in a custody case, to consider the effect on 
the child caused by conflicting religious beliefs of the 
parents.90 
On November 10, 1987, the Court of Appeal denied 
motions for both rehearing and rehearing en banc.91 A 
majority of the nine-judge court ruled that Mendez v. Mendez 
was nothing more than a "quite ordinary'' child custody case. 92 
But three others disagreed. Judge Baskin's dissent stated: 
[W]hat does emerge from the record is a demonstration of 
the experts' personal biases against the mother's religion. 
Their disdain for the mother's religion induced them to 
speculate as to the possibility of harm to the child in the 
future even though no evidence of harm existed. The trial 
86 Id. at 20. 
87 !d. at 2-3. 
88 Mendez v. Mendez, 527 So.2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 
485 u.s. 942 (1988). 
89 ld. 
90 !d. 
91 Id. at 822. 
92 /d. 
457] RELIGIOUS ISSUES IN CHILD CUSTODY 471 
court was obviously persuaded by their less-than-objective 
considerations for removing the child from the custody of her 
natural mother and its judgment should not stand. 
To be forced to choose between one's religion and one's 
child is repugnant to a society based on constitutional 
principles. The soft voice of the minority should be audible to 
a responsible court sensitive to constitutional rights which 
include the right to practice an unpopular religion.93 
Because the appeals court decision did not expressly and 
directly conflict with a decision by another district court of 
appeal of Florida and because the appeals court refused to 
certify the question to the Florida Supreme Court, the decision 
of the District Court of Appeal was not appealable to the 
Florida Supreme Court. 94 Therefore, a Petition For Writ of 
Certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme Court. On 
March 7, 1988, the High Court denied review.95 Rita Mendez, 
denied custody of her daughter because of her religious 
practices, had no further legal recourse. 
In the United States there are two distinct and divergent 
lines of cases on the subject of whether the religious beliefs and 
practices of parents may be considered in a child custody 
dispute. One line of cases makes religion one of several factors 
which may be considered by the court.96 The second line holds 
that religion may be considered only in special 
circumstances.97 The result is that the determination of one's 
fitness as a parent is essentially a matter of geography. 
Typical of the first line of cases is Pennsylvania's Morris 
decision, which held: 
[W]e are convinced that embraced within the best interests 
concept is the stability and consistency of the child's spiritual 
inculcation. It would be an egregious error for our courts in a 
93 ld. at 824. 
94 FLA. CONST. of 1980, art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1980); FLA. R. APP. P. 
9.030(A)(2)(iv). 
95 Mendez v. Mendez, 485 U.S. 942 (1988). 
96 See, e.g., Allison v. Ovens, 421 P.2d 929 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966), cert. 
denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968); Frank v. Frank, 167 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1966); Sinclair v. 
Sinclair, 461 P.2d 750 (Kan. 1969); Quinn v. Franzman, 451 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 
1970); Dean v. Dean, 232 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Morris v. Morris, 412 
A.2d 139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). 
97 See, e.g., Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); in re 
Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498 (1980); Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1985); 
Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980). 
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custody dispute to scrutinize the ability of parents to foster 
the child's emotional development, their capacity to provide 
adequate shelter and sustenance, and their relative income, 
yet not review their respective religious beliefs.98 
Florida, unfortunately for Rita Mendez, adheres to this line of 
cases. 
Cases from the second line of authority hold that religion 
may be considered only if there has been a showing that 
specific religious beliefs or practices are contrary to the child's 
general welfare. The standards range across a broad spectrum. 
At one extreme is the Alabama standard: 
[Q]uestions concerning religious convictions, when reasonably 
related to the determination of whether the prospective 
custodian's convictions might result in physical or mental 
harm to the child, are proper considerations for the trial court 
in a child custody proceeding. 99 
From the opposite viewpoint is a California decision 
requiring a showing of "actual impairment of physical, 
emotional and mental well-being contrary to the best interests 
of the child" before the court may even hear of the religious 
beliefs of the parties. 100 
Between these poles lie formulations of various state courts 
that have dealt with the problem. Another California court 
required a "clear affirmative showing that religious activities 
will be harmful to the child."101 In Colorado, consideration of 
religious beliefs and practices which are "reasonably likely to 
cause present or future harm to the physical or mental 
development of the child" is proper. 102 Idaho requires "a clear 
and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious beliefs 
affect the general welfare of the child."103 In Maine, a court 
may not consider parental religious practices unless the child's 
well-being is "immediately and substantially endangered by the 
religious practice in question."104 
98 Morris, 412 A.2d at 142. 
99 Clift, 346 So.2d at 435. 
100 Quinn, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 516. 
101 Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 81. 
102 Short, 698 P.2d at 1313. 
103 Compton v. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861, 863 (Idaho 1977) (citation omitted). 
104 Osier, 410 A.2d at 1030. 
457] RELIGIOUS ISSUES IN CHILD CUSTODY 473 
The disparity between the two lines of authority is 
significant. For instance, in Morris, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court held that "it is beyond dispute that a young child reared 
into two inconsistent religious traditions will quite probably 
experience some deleterious physical or mental effects. 105 
Yet, Massachusetts reached an opposite conclusion: 
The law ... tolerates and even encourages up to a point the 
child's exposure to the religious influences of both parents 
although they are divided in their faiths . . . . And it is 
suggested, sometimes, that a diversity of religious experience 
is itself a sound stimulant for a child. 106 
Such a disparity should be resolved by the United States 
Supreme Court. Precedent for such an action exists: the High 
Court has previously held that courts may not consider race or 
marital status in custody actions. 107 For reasons of its own 
the Supreme Court did not use Mendez to extend those 
holdings into the area of parental religion. Why not? Several 
factors seem to have contributed to this unfortunate decision 
and the High Court's refusal to hear it on appeal. 
First, the current Court is suffering from significant 
internal tension over the proper interpretation and application 
of the First Amendment religion clauses. Because of this 
tension, the Court has in the past appeared to use any pretext 
to avoid hearing a divisive case involving religion. In recent 
years the Court has rejected or remanded such cases as ARM v. 
Baker and Oregon v. Black, 108 and sidestepped consideration 
of the Equal Access Act, only to have those cases arrive at its 
doorstep a second time. 
But that situation is changing. On April 17, 1990, in 
Employment Division v. Smith/09 the Supreme Court 
radically undercut the reach of the Free Exercise Clause. The 
Court now appears ready to approve virtually any 
governmental action that is generally applicable and facially 
neutral. The new standard makes the achievement of 
protection for religious practices even more difficult than 
before, both in custody cases and elsewhere. The Religious 
105 Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). 
106 Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607-08 (Mass. 1981). 
107 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 658-59 (1972). 
108 483 U.S. 1054 (1987). 
109 494 U.S. 872 (1989). 
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Freedom Restoration Act110 will dilute the negative effect of 
Smith, but its practical effect will be determined by litigation 
as yet only foreseen. 
Second, the trial of Mendez afforded the Court an easy 
rationale for denying review-the constitutional issue was not 
clearly raised by proper objection at the trial level. According to 
house counsel for the Jehovah's Witnesses organization this 
case exemplifies: 
what can happen when one is not sufficiently prepared at 
trial level. We do not make that comment to disparage the 
trial attorney; rather, the trial attorney was caught off guard, 
did not anticipate the prejudice which would follow the 
religious testimony, and tried to 'fight fire with fire,' rather 
than taking action to have the religious testimony 
excluded."111 
Third, the aforementioned Florida appellate rules offered a 
disinclination to grant review. The High Court usually hears 
cases from the federal court system or from state supreme 
courts, not from mid-level state courts of appeal. 
Fourth, the possibility of simple prejudice- at all levels-
against Jehovah's Witnesses (and other minority religions) 
should not be taken lightly. In the American Law Reports 
annotation, "Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and 
Visitation Cases," a separate subsection treats cases involving 
Jehovah's Witnesses, the only group so treated. 112 
Fifth, we see in this case a reflection of perhaps the 
greatest problem facing advocates of religious freedom and 
equality in western societies today: government-and, by 
extension, society-often does not take seriously those who take 
religion seriously. 
Is there a better way? Yes. It is both possible and 
necessary to articulate a standard which adequately balances 
the interests of all concerned. 
It cannot be disputed that the state has a substantial 
interest in the field of domestic relations. 113 The state 
therefore has a duty to protect the welfare of minor children. 
110 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb (1993). 
111 Letter from James M. McCabe, House Counsel, Jehovah's Witnesses, to 
Mitchell A. Tyner (Sept. 22, 1989). 
112 Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 
22 A.L.R. 4th 971 § 9 (1983). 
113 Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (citation omitted). 
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Thus, where it is clearly shown that parental religious 
practices endanger a child's well being, the state has a 
compelling interest in safeguarding the child, and the First 
Amendment does not bar the court from considering religious 
practices in such cases. 
Yet there are competing interests. One is the parents' 
interest in safeguarding their free exercise of religion, in not 
being treated as second-class or undesirable because they 
adhere to an unpopular, minority religion. Another is the 
interest of both parents and government (and, in a larger 
sense, all Americans) in enforcing the constitutional 
requirement of government neutrality; neutrality between 
religions and neutrality between religion and non-religion. An 
adequate standard will balance all those interests. It will 
safeguard the children whose custody is at issue. It will also 
guard against prejudice disguised as judicial discretion. And it 
will guard against inconsistency based only on geography. 
Such a standard was enunciated by the Supreme Court of 
Maine in Osier v. Osier.u4 The Osier test requires the trial 
court to make a preliminary determination of the preferred 
custodial parent without considering either parent's religious 
practices. 115 If the result is the selection of the parent whose 
religious practices are not in issue, the process ends.116 If the 
result is the selection of the other parent, the court may then 
take into account the effect on the child of the challenged 
religious practices, using a two-part analysis: 
[F]irst, in order to assure itself that there exists a factual 
situation necessitating such infringement, the court must 
make a threshold factual determination that the child's 
temporal well-being is immediately and substantially 
endangered by the religious practice in question and, if that 
threshold determination is made, second, the court must 
engage in a deliberate and articulated balancing of the 
conflicting interests involved, to the end that its custody order 
makes the least possible infringement upon the parent's 
liberty interests consistent with the child's well-being. In 
carrying out that two-stage analysis, the trial court should 
make, on the basis of record evidence, specific findings of fact 
114 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980). 
115 ld. at 1029. 
116 ld. 
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concerning its evaluation of all relevant considerations 
bearing upon its ultimate custody order. 117 
Such a standard has much to recommend it. Mter all, 
"Deprivation of the custody of a child is not a 'slender' ... 
punishment: it is a heavy penalty to pay for the exercise of a 
religious belief."118 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Religious beliefs that are unpopular can sometimes be used 
either explicitly or inadvertently for the determination of 
substantive rights in all areas of family law. It should be 
recognized that religious freedom could be seriously hampered 
unless courts look only to the effects of the religious practices. 
Even then, the standards should be the same for any other 
practices when applied to domestic relations issues. 
117 ld. at 1030. 
118 Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
